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E.  Aligning the Purpose of the Essential Facilities 





The modern economy involves far more commerce centered 
around the exchange of information than it did twenty years ago.1 
Information is any collection of concepts or details about the opera-
tion of the world around us, and can help us to understand what we 
do, how we can do those things more efficiently, and lead us to dis-
covering new possibilities. The growth in the rate of exchange of 
information over twenty years, and its utility for commerce, has 
been spurred by innovations in electronic communications and 
analysis, and in turn has spurred additional technological innova-
tions. At times, information is the good placed into commerce,2 
while at other times goods and services are offered so as to make 
use of information.3 The degree of competitiveness within different 
information-related markets differs widely—there are many manu-
facturers of smart phones, but relatively few social networks with 
large usership such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Pinterest, and 
Google Plus.4 
                                                                                                                            
1 See Chuck Jones, Ecommerce Is Growing Nicely While Mcommerce Is On A Tear, 
FORBES (Oct. 2, 2013, 10:08 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckjones/2013/10/
02/ecommerce-is-growing-nicely-while-mcommerce-is-on-a-tear/. 
2 See, e.g., DC Denison, Big Data for Sale: Data Marketplaces, ACQUIA (Mar. 25, 2013), 
http://www.acquia.com/blog/big-data-sale-data-marketplaces (describing public and 
proprietary data gathered and marketed by vendors such as DataMarket, Factual, 
Windows Azure Data Marketplace, ManyEyes, Public Data Explorer, Public Data Sets on 
AWS, and Infochimps). 
3 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, 
INFORMATION ECONOMY REPORT 2013: THE CLOUD ECONOMY AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES xi (2013) available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ier2013
_en.pdf (defining cloud computing as “a paradigm for enabling network access to a 
scalable and elastic pool of shareable physical or virtual resources with on-demand self-
service provisioning and administration”). 
4 See, e.g., The eBusiness Guide, Top 15 Most Popular Social Networking Sites, 
EBIZMBA, (Mar. 2015) http://www.ebizmba.com/articles/social-networking-websites 
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What distinguishes competition in a market infused with in-
formational elements as opposed to physical goods, or services? 
Can information be controlled, even monopolized, by a single firm? 
In that same strain, when is information so unique, complex, or 
otherwise distinct that a potential competitor in its use cannot fea-
sibly replicate it from another source or by independent effort? As-
suming that information is not readily substitutable, and that such 
information is monopolized by a firm, can the information be called 
an essential facility or resource for competition in a marketplace? 
An example of information that is subject to monopolization in-
volves the use of pharmaceutical distribution agreements (and a 
related regulatory order from the FDA) to prevent potential com-
petitors from acquiring the information about the drug necessary to 
know whether they can compete with a pharmaceutical manufac-
turer after filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).5 
This case was recently bolstered by the filing of an amicus brief by 
the Federal Trade Commission in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey.6 The plaintiff alleges that the de-
fendant is using the FDA’s order and its distribution agreements to 
prevent potential generics from purchasing sufficient quantities to 
conduct bioequivalence testing.7 Hence, the defendant is restrict-
ing access to the information essential to filing an ANDA and per-
mitting generic entry.8 
                                                                                                                            
(on file with author) (indicating seven social networks exist with over 100,000,000 unique 
monthly visitors, with Facebook having three times the second-most popular, Twitter). 
5 See Brief for Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae at 1, Mylan Pharms., Inc. 
v. Celgene Corp., (No. 2:14-CV-2094-ES-MAH (D.N.J.) (ongoing 2015), 2014 WL 
2968348, at *1; see also Jonathan Hatch and Thomas W. Pippert, FTC Submits Amicus in 
Mylan v. Celgene, Citing Potential Refusal to Deal Concerns, Mondaq 2014 WLNR 
25603756 (Sept. 16, 2014) (discussing the FTC’s amicus brief filed in support of plaintiffs 
in Mylan). There is presently an interlocutory appeal being considered in the Mylan case 
regarding whether a prior voluntary course of dealing is a necessary element of a refusal to 
deal claim under the antitrust laws. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 
14-2094 (ES)(MAH), 2015 WL 409655, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2015). 
6 See Brief for Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae at 1, Mylan Pharms., Inc. 
v. Celgene Corp., (No. 2:14-CV-2094-ES-MAH (D.N.J.) (ongoing 2015), 2014 WL 
2968348. 
7 See id. at *2. 
8 See id. Note that interlocutory appeal has been certified to the Third Circuit in this 
case on the question of whether a prior course of dealing is a required element for a 
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Another framework supporting the potential monopolization of 
information that one should consider is the following: Firm “X” is 
a monopolist in the market for the provision of Internet service in a 
geographic region.9 As an Internet Service Provider (ISP), Firm X 
is able to gather certain information about its users such as age, 
demographics, wealth, and especially the amount and nature of In-
ternet usage by each individual user. Assume next that Firm X uses 
the collected pool of information to create a new product or ser-
vice, such as a personalized bulletin of regional events of interest 
that is generated from predictive analysis of the individual and ag-
gregated data. Assume further that comparable products cannot be 
created absent a similarly detailed body of information about the 
pool of potential consumers. Last, assume that, apart from the pro-
vision of Internet services, there is no economically practicable 
method for obtaining the information about Internet users. 
Under these numerous assumptions, the monopolist has exclu-
sive access to a resource essential to competing in the new product 
market. Thus, by the economic fluke of being a legally sanctioned 
monopolist in one market, the monopolist has the building blocks 
for an independent second monopoly. If others had the ability to 
access and innovate from that foundation it is also possible that ad-
ditional products or services could be devised from the information 
the monopolist is privy to. Is this reality simply a windfall for a mo-
nopolist, and if so, is there a mechanism under the antitrust laws to 
inject competition into the subsequent markets? Is antitrust inter-
vention even necessary when measured against the economic in-
centive to sell access to the information at a monopoly price that 
extracts the same profits the monopolist could have made through 
its own exclusive use of the information? 
Although the essential facilities doctrine, which grants a limited 
right of course to essential resources,10 is potentially the best-
situated antitrust theory to require access to information that could 
spur innovation, it is so narrowly defined under current antitrust 
                                                                                                                            
Section Two refusal to deal. Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 14-2094 
(ES)(MAH), 2015 WL 409655 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2015) (letter order). 
9 Whether by regulatory decisions or a natural monopoly created by the high fixed 
costs of establishing a network of Internet distribution. 
10 See infra Part II. 
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law that one can question its existence.11 However, information 
economies have certain attributes that could reinvigorate the essen-
tial facilities doctrine.12 As such, even barring a relaxation of the 
necessary elements for an essential facilities claim, the essential 
facilities doctrine may find application in an information econo-
my.13 Included in this discussion are a variety of economic and pol-
icy arguments for why a less stringent definition of the essential 
facilities doctrine might be beneficial in an information economy, 
as opposed to a more traditional economy. 
The essential facilities doctrine from antitrust law can address 
this consideration and continue to foster competition in infor-
mation economies, as well as encourage innovation based on the 
exchange of information or ability to exchange information. Part I 
will discuss what is considered to be an information economy and 
the characteristics that are attributable to information economies, 
while Part II of this Note will briefly summarize the essential facili-
ties doctrine under current law. Part III of this Note will then dis-
cuss the application of the essential facilities doctrine to infor-
mation economies, including how any distinguishing features of 
information economies should or do alter the essential facilities 
analysis. A brief conclusion on the utility of the essential facilities 
doctrine as applied to information economies is then included. 
I. DEFINING INFORMATIONAL ECONOMIES 
Information can be an open resource to all seeking to use it, or 
be considered a form of intellectual property with some degree of 
associated private control.14 From one angle, providing unrestrict-
ed access to information permits the dissemination and utilization 
                                                                                                                            
11 See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1074 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(“Essential facilities doctrine offers perhaps an even more controversial example still” of 
theories of liability for unilateral action.). 
12 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
13 See discussion infra Part III and Conclusion. 
14 See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Licensing the Word on the Street: The SEC’s Role in 
Regulating Information, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007) (“Scholars have long debated the 
level of protection that should be given to intellectual property (including information) 
that falls outside the traditional paradigms of patent and copyright law . . . . At the heart of 
the debate is the perceived need to balance private incentives to produce information 
against the social benefit of making it broadly accessible.”). 
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of the existing pool of knowledge,15 while the intellectual property 
angle supports a system of incentives meant to encourage the de-
velopment of new information.16 Often different types of infor-
mation exist within one market structure. For example, the finan-
cial markets regulated by the SEC can be considered to have at 
least five kinds of information: company-generated information, 
market information, formulae to create derivatives, contracts and 
product design for financial instruments, and the rules for prepar-
ing and spreading information.17 Further, information has multiple 
purposes, only some of which are economic or innovation focused. 
Information, in many forms, has as much intellectual, political, or 
social value as economic value.18 
Networks19 are often central to information economies, permit-
ting the gathering and distribution of information, and providing 
the added attractiveness of great interconnectivity.20 Network in-
dustries come custom-built with two potential choke points for the 
distribution of information: interfaces where information producers 
introduce their content, and the point of distribution to the con-
                                                                                                                            
15 Although open access may also encourage development of new information, those 
adding to the pool of collective knowledge are not legally entitled to recoup any of the 
monetary value of their contributions, as is a fundamental incentive justifying many 
intellectual property regimes. 
16 See Dombalagian, supra note 144, at 4–6. 
17 See id. at 6. 
18 See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Room for Consumers Under the DMCA, 22 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1119, 1119–21 (2007) (“The use of DRMs turns information, once a 
non-excludable public good, into an excludable commodity . . . . While many concerns 
raised by the [commoditization of information by DRMs]—such as price and consumer 
friendliness—are relevant to all types of commodities, other concerns are closely 
connected to information policy. These new mechanisms for physical control over the use 
of copyrighted works may threaten intellectual freedom and fundamental liberties.”). 
19 By “network,” I am referring to markets defined by network economic effects, 
where the value of a good or service increases as the overall number of branches grow: 
telephones, the Internet, social networks, etc. See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher 
S. Yoo, Rethinking Broadband Internet Access, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 28 (2008). 
20 See Mark Cooper, Open Access to the Broadband Internet: Technical and Economic 
Discrimination in Closed, Proprietary Networks, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1013 (2000) 
(“Networks are the essence of the e-world and the internet century into which we are 
embarking. Global scale, fluid movement of information, and commerce have created a 
new economy, a new mode of production.”). 
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sumer.21 The Internet itself consists of various networked physical 
and electronic resources, the existence of which facilitates the great 
variety of websites and Internet applications we see today.22 Two 
aspects of the Internet’s architecture are “essential inputs into 
downstream production of applications and content,” namely the 
network of interconnected physical resources, and the logical 
standards that permit communication between those resources.23 
Access to these resources is essential for the many applications dis-
tributing email, messages, and other information content, as well as 
for the production of websites, blogs, and other Internet-specific 
content.24 Monopolizing the physical or logical infrastructure of 
the Internet is unlikely, but one can easily see the implications for 
competition if a competitor was able to deny access to those re-
sources to its competitors. 
Some authors posit that there is an increasing need to recognize 
the ways in which we exchange information as commons, and to 
regulate them as such, because private property rights fail to max-
imize their potential contributions to the public welfare.25 In par-
ticular, the idea is that “the most important commons—like high-
ways or electricity, information or the Internet” avoid the necessity 
of overcoming transaction costs and allow for low-cost innova-
tion.26 
                                                                                                                            
21 See id. at 1013 (stating that many of the facilities at the choke points were historically 
exclusive, and many may still be natural or economic monopolies). 
22 See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons 
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 1005 (2005). 
23 Id. at 1005. 
24 See id. at 1005 n.334. 
25 See, e.g., id. at 918–919 (exploring the demand-side implications of treating 
infrastructure and information as an open access commons); see also Yochai Benkler, 
Review: Commons and Growth: The Essential Role of Open Commons in Market Economies, 
Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1499, 1499–1500 
(2013) (arguing that symmetric access to an open class of potential users, allocated 
through a non-price mechanism, is beneficial for commons-type goods). 
26 Benkler, supra note 255, at 1502–03 (“The symmetric-use privileges that typify the 
most important commons—like highways or electricity, information or the Internet—
avoid the need for transactions at the margin and allow for low-cost exploration in an 
uncertainty space through experimentation, reassessment, and adaptation to new 
information. Commons obtain this high flexibility at the cost of the power to appropriate 
the benefits of the new action through control of the resource set that enabled it, requiring 
enterprises to seek different leverage points and strategies of appropriation. The elegant 
institutional parsimony of property rights, by contrast, is that, under certain well-
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Another lens for viewing information economies is looking for 
the platforms that support diverse ecosystems of products and ser-
vices.27 Scholars debate whether these platforms should be ana-
lyzed under the net-neutrality framework,28 antitrust tying analy-
sis,29 or the essential facilities as discussed here. 
Some of the markets with relatively few competitors—such as 
social networks—are affected by the economics of networks, where 
more users equal greater value to all users.30 Network-defined mar-
kets tend to support a smaller number of competitors than other 
markets, and often “tip” towards one of the early entrants once a 
sufficient level of interconnectivity is achieved.31 There is unlikely 
to be a broadly defined market of “social networks.” Instead, the 
market is likely defined more narrowly by social networks intended 
for a particular purpose: Facebook and Twitter for social purposes, 
LinkedIn for professional networking, and Pinterest for shared in-
terests.32 
Not all information economies are driven by the value of net-
works to consumers. Some, like big data analytics, benefit from the 
                                                                                                                            
understood conditions, they combine flexibility, information gathering, and an 
appropriation mechanism into a single institutional entity and can be brought to bear at 
the point of action - the transaction. But under the actual conditions of complex modern 
economies—which exhibit transaction costs and, more importantly, are pervaded by 
uncertainty (not merely risk) and replete with unknown unknowns—property can often 
slow down both owners and potential users.”). 
27 See, e.g., Jeffrey Jarosch, Novel “Neutrality” Claims against Internet Platforms: A 
Reasonable Framework for Initial Scrutiny, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 537, 538 (2007) (“In 
today’s Internet, the most important players are not manufacturers, designers, or 
programmers, but platforms. . . .  They offer an environment in which users operate, a 
starting point for them to interact, work, network, and be entertained. These platforms 
build upon the infrastructure of the Internet.”). 
28 See id. at 539. 
29 See id. 
30 See The Secret to Scaling Social Networks and Local Marketplaces, PLATFORM 
THINKING, http://platformed.info/scaling-social-networks-and-marketplaces/ (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2015). 
31 See Reverse Network Effects: Why Today’s Social Networks Can Fail As They Grow 
Larger, WIRED, http://www.wired.com/2014/03/reverse-network-effects-todays-social-
networks-can-fail-grow-larger/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2015). 
32 See About Pinterest, PINTEREST https://about.pinterest.com/en (last visited Mar. 27, 
2015). 
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information available about large masses of consumers.33 Others, 
such as financial markets, benefit from the ability of resources to be 
efficiently allocated as a result of exchanges of information.34 When 
information is the good in question, then the ability of the infor-
mation to be found, accessed, and used by the most interested par-
ties becomes important. Research databases, whether Lexis or 
Westlaw among the legal providers, or JSTOR or SSRN in the 
larger academic community, aim to aggregate, organize, and dis-
seminate the information they contain. For some the information 
and accompanying effort and services are offered for a fee, while 
others such as SSRN, or even Wikipedia, are open to all comers. 
And information itself has value, whether for making informed 
decisions with monetary consequences like loan negotiations,35 for 
Google or Bing to refine their search algorithms based on useful-
ness to searchers,36 or for expansion into a new market that re-
quires familiarity with information that is expensive to acquire.37 If 
one competitor has the information with certain characteristics 
necessary to enter a market where competitiveness depends on ac-
cess to that information, but withholds it from potential competi-
tors, consumers can be harmed.38 Where there could have been 
numerous competitors using an essential pool of information to in-
novate and create products that attract consumers, instead there is 
one competitor determining what product will be developed for the 
                                                                                                                            
33 See Justin Hienz, Introduction: Defining the Data Movement, in U.S. CHAMBER OF 




34 See Dombalagian, supra note 144, at 1 (“Information is said to be the lifeblood of 
financial markets . . . . [Financial information is necessary] for the efficient allocation of 
capital in the global economy.”). 
35 See Ruling on Motion to Dismiss, In re: LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments 
Antitrust Litigation, 935 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No. 1:11-md-02262 (NRB), slip op. at 4–8 
(S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 29, 2013), available at http://sdnyblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/11-MD-02262-2013.03.29-Ruling-on-Motion-to-Dismiss.pdf. 
36 See Frank Pasquale, Search as Speech: Two Scenarios, CONCURRING OPINIONS, 2012 
WLNR 11280685 (May 29, 2012) (available on Westlaw Next). 
37 See Hienz, supra note 333, at 2–6. 
38 See Sergio Baches Opi, The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Intellectual 
Property Licensing in the European Union and the United States: Are Intellectual Property 
Rights Still Sacrosanct?, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 409, 481 (2001). 
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market. This has the serious potential to result in higher prices and 
fewer competing products, as well as fewer products for consumers 
to purchase in general. 
Google scans the information in the inboxes of users of Gmail.39 
Facebook has access to information connecting individuals through 
their geographic ties, educational experiences, social and familial 
activities, and across a span of years.40 Apple has access to the col-
lective multimedia purchasing habits of millions of users, just as 
Amazon does for a far larger universe of purchases. It is not fun-
damentally improper for these companies to have acquired the in-
formation in their possession, and possession of the information 
does not necessitate having an anticompetitive purpose in mind. 
The information is in their possession as a result of the large net-
work of purchasers they have attracted to their products, and is a 
side effect of that success. 
If Google takes the collective information from it users’ email 
and begins to develop a program to offer unsolicited suggestions of 
websites, literature, and products for consumers, it has an infor-
mation advantage over its competitors if they do not have access to 
a comparable source of information. This advantage does not come 
from greater investment in research for the new market, but in-
stead as a result of the information accompanying its network of 
integrated Google products. The same would be true of Facebook 
branching into real estate location suggestions based on its 
knowledge of the residents of a neighborhood, or Amazon offering 
financial investment advice based on the detailed purchasing histo-
ries of its users and the predictive value of that information. 
Each of the new products or services that can be offered using 
the described pools of information is in a market that could be sub-
ject to competition. However, without access to a comparable in-
formational resource, the competitors will be unlikely to offer 
products that are on the same plane as those developed with the 
information. Consumers will be better off if the information, which 
was accrued as a result of a different economic enterprise, is shared 
                                                                                                                            
39 See Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/
#infocollect (last visited Apr. 7, 2015). 
40 See Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited Apr. 
7, 2015). 
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on reasonable terms as an essential facility in order to facilitate 
competition on the products that can be developed from that in-
formation. 
II. THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE 
Amongst the variety of anticompetitive practices that have 
been alleged as tools of monopoly or dominant firms is the denial of 
a facility essential to competition.41 The essential facilities doctrine 
posits that it is anticompetitive to allow a monopolist in a market 
that has exclusive control over an input essential to that market to 
deny potential competitors access in order to concentrate control 
over that market.42 
In MCI Communications Corp. v. American Telephone and Tele-
graph Co. the Seventh Circuit articulated the four elements of the 
essential facilities doctrine: “(1) control of the essential facility by a 
monopolist; (2) a competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to 
duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facili-
ty to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facili-
ty.”43 The first element under MCI necessarily has two sub-
elements that also need to be proven: a defined market in which the 
defendant is a monopolist over the facility or resource; and the de-
fined market for which the facility is purportedly essential.44 An-
other aspect is implicated by the first MCI factor, but is addressed 
directly in the second MCI element: the essential nature of the fa-
cility. If sufficiently close substitutes existed, or if the facility were 
                                                                                                                            
41 See, e.g., TCA Building Co. v. Nw. Resources Co., 873 F. Supp. 29, 39 (S.D. Tex. 
1995). 
42 See, e.g., Opi, supra note 388, at 437–39. 
43 MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir. 
1983). Note also that the essential facilities doctrine is occasionally conflated with the 
antitrust doctrines of refusal to deal, and the antitrust duty to deal, which have different 
required elements from the essential facilities doctrine. See, Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft 
Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1074 (10th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing refusal to deal from the 
essential facilities doctrine). For example, refusal to deal requires a pre-existing profitable 
relationship between firms. See id. at 1074–75. 
44 See TCA Building Co., 873 F. Supp. at 34. 
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easily replicated, then the facility in question would not be essen-
tial.45 
Monopoly power is, in a nutshell, the ability to raise prices 
without losing profit in information economies as well as other 
markets. A firm with monopoly power is not constrained by its 
competitors, so that raising prices to a monopoly level equates to 
increased profits as opposed to an unprofitable loss of business to 
competitors.46 
Monopolization is the active behavior with an intent to acquire 
or maintain the power to raise prices supracompetitively through 
anticompetitive means.47 The state of being a monopoly is not itself 
a base of liability.48 Monopolies that exist or are maintained as a 
result of business acumen, historic accident, or changes in consum-
er demand are not the object of the antitrust laws.49 It is only when 
a firm seeks to obtain a monopoly and presents a substantial danger 
of succeeding,50 or attempts to maintain a monopoly through anti-
competitive measures, that there is liability under the antitrust 
laws.51 
Firms can compete against one another based on price or quali-
ty within a market for a good—and attempt to monopolize the pro-
vision of that good—or firms can compete for a market that can on-
ly support a single firm. Price competition within a market can oc-
cur when multiple firms produce highly substitutable goods, thus 
pushing prices down towards marginal cost.52 Markets with this 
                                                                                                                            
45 See, e.g., MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1129–30 (9th Cir. 
2004); TCA Building Co., 873 F. Supp. at 39. 
46 See Novell, 731 F.3d at 1070. 
47 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT 
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT, at 5 (2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681_chapter1.pdf. 
48 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429–30 (2d Cir. 1945). 
49 See id.; see also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61–62 (1911); Daniel F. 
Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The Hidden 
Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822, 1826–27 (2007). 
50 See Novell, 731 F.3d at 1071 n.2 (citing Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 
459 (1993)). 
51 See id. at 1070. 
52 See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1123 (7th Cir. 
1983). 
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dynamic can, and are expected to, support multiple firms.53 By 
comparison, some markets are natural monopolies that can only 
sustain a single firm of large scale, whether a local telephone net-
work54 or the market for PC software55 in information economies. 
Frequently, these markets are described as Schumpeterian mar-
kets, where the competition is for the market in a serial set of con-
tests to become the sitting monopolist.56 
If a market is capable of supporting multiple firms competing 
on quality or price, then market share is a useful proxy for market 
power.57 Although the amount of market share necessary to raise 
prices is different on a case-by-case basis, one rule of thumb is that 
there can be no market power with a share of 33% or less; there may 
be market power with a share of 60% or more; and market power 
may generally be presumed with a share of 90%.58 In markets com-
peting on price and quality, monopolization is best understood as 
the anticompetitive effort to consolidate market share sufficient to 
raise prices.59 Informational markets supporting multiple competi-
tors competing on price or quality do not require a different form of 
analysis than comparable traditional markets for monopoly power, 
or monopolization.60 Monopoly power is represented by the proxy 
of market share, or direct evidence,61 while monopolization contin-
ues to be the attempt to acquire or maintain the desired power 
                                                                                                                            
53 See Marina Lao, Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 11 NW. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 275, 291–97 (2013) (discussing the distinction between markets 
facing dynamic competition compared to price competition). 
54 See Axel Gautier and Manipushpak Mitra, Regulation of an Open Access Essential 
Facility, 75 ECONOMICA 662, 662 (2008). 
55 See Richard Schmalensee, Antitrust Issues in Schumpeterian Industries, 90 AM. ECON. 
REV. 192, 192–96 (2000). 
56 See id. 
57 See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1076–77 (10th Cir. 2013). 
58 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945). 
59 See, e.g., LAWRENCE J. WHITE, MARKET POWER AND MARKET DEFINITION IN 
MONOPOLIZATION CASES: A PARADIGM IS MISSING, (Jan. 24, 2007) available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/single_firm/docs/222104.pdf. 
60 See Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 534, 593–94 (2003). 
61 See United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 190–91 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(concerning direct evidence in a section 1 case). 
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through anticompetitive means, including abuse of an essential fa-
cility.62 
If competition in a market is more aptly described as competi-
tion for the market, then defining market power is conceptually 
more difficult. Successful possession of the market equates to high 
market share and the ability to set prices,63 but there is the added 
behavioral constraint of who might be on the horizon to take the 
market with a new product if the return to the sitting firm is too 
lucrative, or self-innovation too slow.64 Just as a competitor should 
not be punished for succeeding at the task society asks of it,65 a 
competitor who succeeds and wins a market that makes it a de fac-
to monopolist should not be liable to, or handicapped relative to, its 
potential competitors.66 
Monopolization in this environment takes on an entirely new 
color. Monopolists should be permitted to, and encouraged to, 
compete on the merits because this is what drives innovation and 
better prices for consumers.67 However, the development of dy-
namic markets should not be impeded by the actions of the sitting 
monopolist because this forecloses new benefits from competitive 
enterprise.68 This is especially true if that monopolist is using the 
sword of monopoly control of an essential resource and is simulta-
neously adopting the shield that market power is difficult to infer in 
a market imbued with Schumpeterian tendencies.69 
A. Procompetitive Purpose of the Essential Facilities Doctrine 
The essential facilities doctrine, on its face, appears to reinforce 
the requirement that competitors compete on the merits of their 
products and not on advantages resulting from factors outside the 
particular market, like the supply of inputs. If competition is the 
mechanism provided by markets to drive down costs and improve 
                                                                                                                            
62 See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1826–27. 
63 See Schmalensee, supra note 55, at 194. 
64 See id. 
65 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945). 
66 See Schmalensee, supra note 55, at 194–95. 
67 See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1827–28. 
68 See Tilman Klump and Xuejuan Su, Open Access and Dynamic Efficiency, 2 AM. 
ECON. J.: MICROECON. 64, 64–66 (2010). 
69 See id. 
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the quality of products and services, then foreclosing competition 
on all of the features other than the essential input due to one par-
ty’s exclusive control is detrimental to consumers.70 Antitrust law 
is intended to foster competition where practicable in the name of 
consumer welfare, and the essential facilities doctrine can be seen 
as a means of protecting or injecting competition into a market sus-
ceptible to monopolization due to structural factors.71 
B. Limits of the Essential Facilities Doctrine 
The essential facilities doctrine is not without its skeptics, 
shortcomings, intellectual and practical difficulties. As Justice Scal-
ia noted in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, LLP, the Supreme Court has never expressly embraced, or 
even used the essential facilities doctrine.72 The essential facility 
may find its intellectual roots in Supreme Court doctrine,73 but it 
has not received subsequent recognition by the Court to-date. Alt-
hough the Supreme Court has not accepted the essential facilities 
doctrine, neither has it expressly rejected it.74 Because of this, 
plaintiffs have continued to bring claims under the essential facili-
ties doctrine, and at least some courts have entertained them.75 A 
                                                                                                                            
70 See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1073 (10th Cir. 2013). 
71 See Lao, supra note 53, at 287. 
72 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004). 
73 See, e.g., United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) (an essential 
point of rail line access into St. Louis); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 
366 (1973) (an essential means of power transmission to a local distribution network); see 
also Opi, supra note 388, at 435–39. 
74 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411 (“ . . . we find no need either to recognize it or repudiate 
it here.”). 
75 See, e.g., MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(Trinko was decided “[e]ven though the essential facilities doctrine is followed in this and 
other circuits”), on remand from Qwest Corp. v. MetroNet Servs. Corp., 540 U.S. 1147 
(2004) (following decision on Trinko); Covad Commc’ns Co. v. BellS. Corp., 374 F.3d 
1044, 1049–50 (11th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that the essential facilities continues in a 
more restricted form), on remand from BellS. Corp. v. Covad Commc’ns Co., 540 U.S. 
1147 (2004); Sunbeam Television Corp. v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 
1341, 1349–50 (S.D. Fla. 2011); Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel 
Commc’ns, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1112–14 (D. Colo. 2004). Contra Novell, Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1072 (10th Cir. 2013) (reiterating opposition to the 
essential facilities doctrine); cf. SolidFX, LLC v. Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 
2d 1069, 1083 (D. Colo. 2013). 
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final decision on the utility of the essential facilities doctrine is still 
percolating in the district and circuit courts. 
Further, lower courts have applied the requirements articulated 
in MCI in a narrow fashion, requiring a high degree of control by 
the monopolist, significant barriers to reproduction of the facility, 
articulable means of permitting access, and denials of access with-
out sufficient alternate justifications.76 
C. What is an Essential Facility in the Information Economy? 
There are numerous situations when a particular form or quan-
tity of information is necessary to compete in a market. As illus-
trated in the introduction, knowledge of the bioequivalency of pa-
tented pharmaceutical compounds to potential generics is neces-
sary to file an ANDA.77 Search engines require multitudes of data 
from users on the utility of results in order to “train” and refine 
the algorithms.78 Even political data services require vast stores of 
information about the electorate to identify and capitalize on the 
possibility of micro-targeting likely voters during election cycles.79 
Information can therefore be essential for competition in a market-
place.80 For example, in financial markets, much of the information 
about financial instruments is available publicly through the mar-
ketplace or through disclosures eventually, but even differential 
timing of access to the information can impact commerce, and 
greater restrictions on access “might result in the limitation of 
downstream uses.”81 
                                                                                                                            
76 See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1848–49. 
77 See Brief for Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae at 1, Mylan Pharms., Inc. 
v. Celgene Corp., (No. 2:14-CV-2094-ES-MAH (D.N.J.) (ongoing 2015), 2014 WL 
2968348, at *3. 
78 See Pasquale, supra note 366. 
79 See How ‘Microtargeting’ Works in Political Advertising, PBS NEWSHOUR (Feb. 18, 
2014, 6:27 PM), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/how-microtargeting-
works-political-advertising/. 
80 See, e.g., Dombalagian, supra note 144, at 1–2 (“The availability of and access to such 
[financially related] information on reasonable terms has been identified as one of the 
essential characteristics of strong financial markets.”) (discussing the SEC’s role in 
regulating access to information in financial markets). 
81 See id. at 83 (suggesting that the SEC should consider prohibiting vertical integration 
of “essential” information with entities downstream where there are potential conflicts of 
interest, but that “[o]therwise, privately adopted limitations on information or other 
goods that are “inputs” for subsequent processes are best left to antitrust law”). 
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In addition to information itself being essential for competition, 
access to the channels of distribution of information can be essen-
tial. The essential facilities doctrine, although tentatively traceable 
in its early expression to concerns about access to the infrastruc-
ture supporting commerce by railroad82 may be most applicable 
when the facility in question is akin to an infrastructure resource.83 
Sometimes that information can be acquired through the in-
vestment of any interested competitor, or the information is openly 
shared. Databases exist for many types of information on a sub-
scription basis, from records of commercial transactions, social ac-
tivities online, and data sets collected by international organiza-
tions.84 Surveys may be commissioned.85 Research, experimenta-
tion, and individual effort can develop the required information.86 
Government and academic resources have compiled many data sets 
that are open for commercial use, or commercial uses may be nego-
tiated for.87 Or, competitors can often buy the underlying data di-
rectly from a willing competitor.88 
                                                                                                                            
82 See Spulber and Yoo, supra note 499, at 1829 (discussing how Terminal Railroad was 
decided under section 1 of the Sherman Act, as it was a collective group of railroads 
excluding access to the facility to competitors, and also that multiple other means of 
bringing goods and people into the community existed). 
83 See Benkler, supra note 255, at 1529 (discussing Frischmann’s analysis of ideas, 
intellectual property, telecommunications, roads, and ecosystems as forms of 
infrastructure broadly, and treating that infrastructure as a subset of a legal commons); see 
also Lao, supra note 53, at 287–90 (discussing how two of the most applicable market 
structures for the essential facilities doctrine may be natural monopolies, especially in 
infrastructure, and public utilities). 
84 See Hienz, supra note 373, at 3. 
85 See, e.g., SURVATA, http://www.survata.com/how-it-works; SURVEY MONKEY, 
http://www.surveymonkey.com/audience; QUALTRICS, http://www.qualtrics.com/. 
86 See John Raidt, The Competitiveness Agenda, in U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
FOUNDATION, THE FUTURE OF DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION 31, 32–33 (2014), 
http://www.uschamberfoundation.org/sites/default/files/Data%20Report%20Final%201
0.23.pdf (discussing the technologies such as sensors that can generate information about 
consumer use of products). 
87 See Leslie Bradshaw, The Great Data Revolution, in U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
FOUNDATION, THE FUTURE OF DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION 21, 26 (2014) (discussing 
Harvard’s Engineering Social Systems program, as well as non-profit and governmental 
data sets). 
88 See, e.g., Denison, supra note 2 (discussing Microsoft’s Windows Azure Data 
Marketplace). 
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In other circumstances, significant barriers exist to the acquisi-
tion of the needed information. If, for example, an aggregation of 
information about a number of consumers, or an equivalent large 
database of information, is necessary in order to develop a product 
in an informational market, then all potential entrants in that mar-
ket will be seeking that information.89 However, the size of that da-
ta set may require purchasing access to multiple pre-existing com-
mercial databases at a combined cost that is prohibitive.90 Or, if it is 
necessary to develop the information from the ground up, the per-
unit cost of information may be prohibitively expensive to justify 
gathering solely for the purpose of developing a single product in a 
single market.91 Absent some other reason that the information 
would be developed—for example, value in multiple markets that 
defrays the costs or its creation as a side-effect of a separate, 
tipped, network-economy market—there would be little incentive 
for any potential entrant to develop the good.92 
Acquisition, or creation, of the information may be infeasible 
both practically and economically. Either the costs of creating the 
resource exceed any potential profits, or if multiple parties invest in 
developing the resource separately the resulting pool of profits is 
not large enough to divide and successfully recoup anyone’s costs, 
in which case parties would only invest if they could be sure no 
others were investing.93 
                                                                                                                            
89 See, e.g., Dombalagian, supra note 144, at 1–2 (discussing the drive to collect 
information in financial markets, and the strength provided to the financial system when 
information is widely disseminated). 
90 See, e.g., Matthew Harding, Good Data Public Policies, in CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
FOUNDATION, THE FUTURE OF DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION 43, 47 (2014) (discussing the 
structural and cost burdens associated with generating and aggregating useful data). 
91 See Pasquale, supra note 366 (discussing the “brute disadvantage” faced by search 
engines without access to the user data held by Google). 
92 See id.; Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified 
Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U.L. REV. 105, 156 n.273 (2010) (noting 
that Internet Service Providers are gaining the capacity to track the kinds of content 
transmitted through their systems). 
93 See, e.g., Bradshaw, supra note 877, at 28 (discussing some of the advantages that can 
accrue to a first-mover). 
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III. THE ROLE OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE 
IN INFORMATION ECONOMIES 
Access to this information as an essential facility fosters compe-
tition that benefits consumers. While many commentators suggest 
a hands-off approach to antitrust intervention in dynamic infor-
mation economies,94 others take the position that erring on the side 
of requiring more competition at every level is better public poli-
cy.95 As one commentator mentioned: 
It is impossible to find better interpretations and 
applications of data without access to it . . . . Cur-
rent advantage [in certain scale industries liked] 
search is likely to be self-reinforcing, especially giv-
en that so many more people are using the services 
now than when Google overtook other search en-
gines in the early 2000s.96 
When the above market conditions exist and one competitor 
has possession of the essential facility as a result of investments in 
exogenous markets or as a fortuitous side-effect of being the mo-
nopolist to which a network-economy tipped, or because it is simp-
ly in possession of information about intellectual property that is 
instrumental to competition, public policy would suggest that the 
resource be shared.97 
Courts certainly will have to consider whether the possessor 
happened upon the opportunity to possess the information—or 
elected to invest in its creation and the extraction of its value for 
another, independent, market in ruling on an essential facilities 
                                                                                                                            
94 See, e.g., Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1900–01. 
95 See Cooper, supra note 20, at 1014 (“Moreover, when we come to information 
industries and networks, public policy should be particularly procompetitive and err 
toward requiring more, not less, competition. Interconnection creates greater leverage 
than one finds in other markets. Information flows not only through the marketplace of 
goods and services, but also through the marketplace of ideas.”). 
96 See Pasquale, supra note 366 (illustrating how the First Amendment defense to 
antitrust allegations leveled at search engines often skips any analysis of whether there is 
any competition). 
97 See, e.g., Mark R. Patterson, Leveraging Information About Patents: Settlements, 
Portfolios, and Holdups, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 483, 484 (2012) (discussing the litigation 
advantage held by patent holders due to uncertainty about the underlying patent’s scope 
and validity, not the existence of infringement). 
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doctrine claim.98 Barring situations in which the information is pro-
tected by intellectual property rights granting exclusive control for 
all uses of the information, consumers of resulting goods and ser-
vices benefit from policies encouraging the possessor to compete 
for any additional profits from possession of the information.99 The 
potential long-term impact on the dynamic market is discussed be-
low. 
A. What Are Monopolization and Monopoly in the Information 
Economy? 
As noted above in Part II, monopoly power is the ability to raise 
prices without losing profits in information economies as well as 
other markets. Whether information is the product, as in the provi-
sion of financial market information,100 or information is an input 
into a product, such as predictive advertising101 or knowledge of a 
pharmaceutical’s bioequivalency,102 the consumer harm is the abil-
ity to unilaterally raise prices or decrease quality.103 Although the 
harm feared is the same in informational as well as other markets, 
the ability to define and identify the presence of monopoly power 
presents some of the greatest difficulty.104 
                                                                                                                            
98 See, e.g., Hienz, supra note 373, at 4 (“Data is an asset. As such, much of the data 
generated every day is proprietary. An online retailer owns the data listing its customers’ 
purchases, and a pharmaceutical company owns data from testing its products. This is 
appropriate, since businesses bear costs to generate, store, and analyze data and then 
enjoy the innovative fruits that grow out of it.”). 
99 See James Turney, Defining the Limits of the EU Essential Facilities Doctrine on 
Intellectual Property Rights: The Primacy of Securing Optimal Innovation, 3 NW. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 179, 183 (2005) (“as a matter of policy, competition law should 
not intervene to protect competitors unless the ultimate benefits to consumers outweigh 
the rights of the intellectual property right holder.”). 
100 See, e.g., supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
101 See, e.g., Adam Popescu, The Next Wave of Ads Knows Everything About You—Before 
You Do, MASHABLE (July 26, 2013), http://mashable.com/2013/07/26/inference-adver
tising/. 
102 See Brief for Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae at 1, Mylan Pharms., Inc. 
v. Celgene Corp., (No. 2:14-CV—2094-ES-MAH (D.N.J.) (ongoing 2015), 2014 WL 
2968348, at *3. 
103 See Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir. 2013). 
104 See id. at 1071 (discussing how the issue of market definition and market power had 
been stipulated by the parties, avoiding a protracted analysis on what is usually the core 
issue). 
2015] ESSENTIAL FACILITIES IN INFORMATION ECONOMIES 815 
 
As discussed in Part II, above, the state of being a monopoly is 
not itself a base of liability; acts of monopolization are necessary. 
Monopolies that exist or are maintained as a result of business ac-
umen, historic accident, or changes in consumer demand are not 
the object of the antitrust laws.105 It is only when a firm seeks to 
obtain a monopoly and presents a substantial danger of succeed-
ing,106 or attempts to maintain a monopoly through anticompetitive 
measures, that there is liability under the antitrust laws.107 Exam-
ples of monopolization that are pertinent to informational markets 
include Microsoft’s multiple efforts to prevent Netscape from 
gaining traction against Internet Explorer in order to preserve the 
Windows operating system monopoly,108 and the continued pur-
chasing of user data and the expertise necessary to understand it by 
companies like Facebook and Google.109 Withholding an essential 
facility from competitors to foreclose competition in an adjacent 
market is the core theory of monopolization in this analysis.110 
Competition in markets tends to take one of two forms, as dis-
cussed in Part II. Firms can compete against one another based on 
price or quality within a market for a good (and attempt to monopo-
lize the provision of that good), or firms can compete for a market 
that can only support a single firm. Price competition within a mar-
ket is exemplified by multiple firms producing highly substitutable 
goods.111 Markets with this dynamic can, and are expected to, sup-
port multiple firms.112 By comparison, some markets are natural 
                                                                                                                            
105 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429–30 (2d Cir. 1945); see 
also Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61–62 (1911); Spulber & Yoo, 
supra note 499, at 1826–27. 
106 See Novell, 731 F.3d at 1071 n.2 (citing Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 
459 (1993)). 
107 See id. at 1070. 
108 See id. 
109 See Martin Robbins, Mark Zuckerberg’s Information Monopoly, VICE (Feb. 28, 2014), 
http://www.vice.com/read/google-whatsapp-martin-robbins (discussing the implications 
of Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp and Google’s prior acquisition of DeepMind 
Technologies). 
110 See, e.g., Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1833–34 (discussing the vertical 
relationship of markets under the essential facilities doctrine). 
111 See Alan J. Meese, Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm, 89 MINN. L. 
REV. 743, 773 (2005). 
112 See Lao, supra note 53, at 291–97 (discussing the distinction between markets facing 
dynamic competition compared to price competition). 
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monopolies that can only sustain a single large firm, whether a local 
telephone network113 or the market for PC software114 in infor-
mation economies. These Schumpeterian markets exhibit competi-
tion for the market in a serial set of contests to become the sitting 
monopolist.115 
If a market is capable of supporting multiple firms competing 
on quality or price, then market share is a useful proxy for market 
power.116 Informational markets supporting multiple competitors 
competing on price or quality are no different in analysis than com-
parable traditional markets.117 Monopoly power is represented by 
the proxy of market share, or more rarely is shown by direct evi-
dence,118 while monopolization continues to be the attempt to ac-
quire or maintain the desired power through anticompetitive 
means, including abuse of an essential facility.119 
Monopolization in an environment of competition for the mar-
ket takes on an entirely different color.120 Monopolists should be 
permitted to, and encouraged to, compete on the merits in order to 
innovate and offer better products at better prices.121 However, the 
development of dynamic markets should not be impeded by the 
actions of the sitting monopolist where subsequent innovation is 
foreclosed.122 This is especially true where a monopolist is simulta-
neously utilizing monopoly power over a resource while adopting 
the shield that market power is difficult to infer in a market imbued 
with Schumpeterian tendencies.123 
It is the opinion of many commentators that given the dynamic 
nature of information economies, static measures of market power 
                                                                                                                            
113 See Gautier & Mitra, supra note 54, at 662. 
114 See Schmalensee, supra note 55, at 193. 
115 See id. 
116 See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1071 (10th Cir. 2013). 
117 See Weiser, supra note 60, at 575. 
118 See United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 190–91 (3d Cir. 2005) (direct 
evidence in a section 1 case). 
119 See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1826. 
120 See discussion supra Part II. 
121 See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1827–28. 
122 See Tilman Klumpp and Xuejuan Su, Open Access and Dynamic Efficiency, 2 AM. 
ECON. J.: MICROECON. 64, 64 (2010). 
123 See, e.g., Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2013). 
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are inadequate under the circumstances.124 Static snapshots of a 
market’s division do not account for the rapid pace of growth, in-
novation, and disruption of market positions.125 Assuming that this 
argument that static measures of markets are imperfect gauges of 
ongoing change is true, economic analyses still suggest that static 
analysis may be sufficient for antitrust purposes (as well as one of 
the most stable options conceptually).126 Where there is competi-
tion for a market, as opposed to price competition within a market, 
the ability to exclude subsequent potential entrants from the mar-
ket may initially incentivize innovation, but, if too effective, deter 
innovation beyond the first-mover’s.127 
B. What Does Control Over and Unjustified Denial of an Essential 
Facility Look Like? 
In order to establish a claim under the essential facilities doc-
trine in an information economy, in addition to identifying an es-
sential facility as discussed above, a claimant must demonstrate 
that the defendant exercised control of that facility (the first MCI 
element) and denied access unjustifiably (the third MCI ele-
ment).128 Accompanying the section, above, on identifying when a 
facility is essential for competition in an information economy, was 
a discussion of the economic and legal barriers that can exist to the 
duplication of a facility.129 As discussed below, some of these at-
tributes, such as intellectual property rights or the necessity of an 
underlying natural monopoly to the development of information, 
also speak to control of an essential facility by a monopolist.130 
                                                                                                                            
124 See, e.g., id. at 1071; Lao, supra note 53, at 291. 
125 See Schmalensee, supra note 55, at 193. 
126 See Joshua Gans, When is Static Analysis a Sufficient Proxy for Dynamic 
Considerations? Reconsidering Antitrust and Innovation, in 11 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE 
ECONOMY xiii (2011) (Introduction on file with author). 
127 See id. (discussing how allowing an established incumbent to prevent entry has the 
effect of reducing investment in innovation, which results in greater utility of static 
analyses in assessing dynamic markets). 
128 See MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir. 
1983); see also discussion supra Part II. 
129 See discussion, supra, notes 77–93 and accompanying text. 
130 See discussion, infra, notes 134–158 and accompanying text. 
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Control of an essential facility can be understood as the ability 
to exclude others from its use.131 Essential facilities in the infor-
mation economy can be both information necessary to compete in 
an industry or channels of distribution for information-related 
products and services, as discussed in the above section on defining 
essential facilities.132 The ability to restrict access to either essential 
information or means of distribution in their entirety would 
demonstrate control adequate for the essential facilities doctrine.133 
If the essential facility is information, then exclusion can occur 
as the result of intellectual property rights possessed over the in-
formation134 or simply by being the firm in possession of infor-
mation that cannot feasibly be duplicated by competitors.135 Intel-
lectual property rights over information essential to competition 
are most likely to exist in the form of patents or trade secrets.136 In 
most instances, copyright protection would extend only to a partic-
ular expression of the essential information and not the underlying 
information itself.137 Similarly, the protection trademarks extend to 
marks identifying manufacturers is unlikely to impact essential in-
formation.138 Additionally, mere possession of the information can 
equate to control if the information is of a type incapable of dupli-
cation due to economic or practical realities.139 
Possession of intellectual property rights over the essential in-
formation adds a complication to the essential facilities analysis. 
Information in the information economy frequently has intellectual 
                                                                                                                            
131 See, e.g., Opi, supra note 388, at 502–03. 
132 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
133 See Lao, supra note 53, at 298. 
134 See Joseph Farrell, Intellectual Property as a Bargaining Environment, 9 INNOV. POL’Y 
AND THE ECON. 39, 39 (2009) (“Intellectual property policy relies on bargaining in the 
shadow of exclusivity.”). 
135 See discussion supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. 
136 See, e.g., Amy Rachel Davis, Note, Patented Embryonic Stem Cells: The Quintessential 
“Essential Facility”?, 94 GEO. L. REV. 205, 218 n.58, 228–29 (2005); Lao, supra note 53, 
at 282, 282 n.43. 
137 See, Opi, supra note 388, at 448 (citing Mark R. Patterson, When is Property 
Intellectual?: The Leveraging Problem, 73 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1133, 1139–41 (2000)). 
138 See, e.g., Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1353 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(describing trademarks as protecting the goodwill and quality standards of a business). 
139 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
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property rights attached.140 Although the mere existence of intel-
lectual property rights, such as patents, is not determinative of 
market power,141 if the information has already been deemed essen-
tial for competition in a market, then the grant of exclusivity con-
fers market power.142 As in the realm of pay-for-delay agreements 
with patents, the balance between intellectual property rights and 
antitrust law is complicated.143 Patents and trade secrets, with their 
grants of exclusivity, have different implications for the essential 
facilities doctrine, which looks to unjustified denials of access.144 
Although there may be uses of information outside of the grant of 
the intellectual property rights implicating the essential facilities 
doctrine, this Note primarily analyzes information unencumbered 
by intellectual property. 
Determining the appropriate balance between the exclusivity 
given to holders of intellectual property rights and the essential fa-
cilities doctrine is not necessary within the scope of this Note. 
However, the general criticism of the doctrine in the absence of 
intellectual property suggests that policy arguments would favor 
intellectual property over forced grants of access as an essential 
facility.145 
In the example supported by the FTC in its amicus brief, even 
with situations involving intellectual property, the essential infor-
mation can be information about the intellectual property and not 
the information contained and protected by intellectual property 
itself.146 The bioequivalencies of a patented pharmaceutical,147 the 
scope and validity of a patent,148 or the pool of data used to refine 
                                                                                                                            
140 See Dombalagian, supra note 144, at 4. 
141 See Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006). 
142 See Farrell, supra note 1344, at 39. 
143 See Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013). 
144 See Pasquale, supra note 366 (describing how the information contained within a 
patent is public and protected for a limited period, whereas trade secrets are protected for 
as long as the information can remain hidden). 
145 See Lao, supra note 53, at 307. 
146 See Brief for Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae at 1, Mylan Pharms., Inc. 
v. Celgene Corp., (No. 2:14-CV-2094-ES-MAH (D.N.J.) (ongoing 2015), 2014 WL 
2968348, at *1. 
147 See id. 
148 See Patterson, supra note 977, at 484. 
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an algorithm protected as a trade secret149 are all within the realm 
of the essential facilities doctrine and the more straightforward 
analysis discussed next. The ability to exclude others from use of 
information purely by their inability to access comparable alterna-
tives is more straightforward. If it is (a) known from the analysis on 
essentiality that information is not feasible to reproduce150 and it is 
(b) known that only one firm possesses the information,151 then that 
firm controls the information. 
If the essential facility is the means of distributing information, 
as opposed to the information itself, then the analysis focuses on 
the degree of a firm’s control over the channels of distribution and 
whether competitors are being denied access.152 In particular, if 
there is evidence that the potential competitors could buy access to 
the channel of distribution, then the monopolist is likely not deny-
ing access.153 Especially if the monopolist is providing retail access 
to non-competitors at the same price offered to potential competi-
tors.154 Even asking for an access fee in excess of the retail cost is 
not determinative on the question of whether access is being unjus-
tifiably denied to competitors.155 Whether a monopolist elects to 
offer access to its resource may also depend on any inherent capaci-
ty limits for the resource that would force a choice between their 
own uses and access to others.156 In the absence of anticompetitive 
purpose, even a monopolist can choose whom to deal with and on 
what terms,157 including extracting the monopoly price from a po-
tential competitor through price-discrimination.158 
Proof of denial of access to an essential facility must be but-
tressed by evidence that the denial was unjustified.159 Innovation in 
                                                                                                                            
149 See Pasquale, supra note 366. 
150 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
151 This aspect is necessary for the firm to be the proper defendant to any litigation as a 
monopolist, a point an improperly sued litigant would surely raise in a motion to dismiss. 
152 See Lao, supra note 53, at 298. 
153 See id. 
154 See In re Adderall XR Antitrust Litigation, 754 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2014). 
155 See id. (discussing the Supreme Court’s consideration of refusal to sell at retail price 
as a factor to consider). 
156 See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1861. 
157 See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). 
158 See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1859. 
159 See Lao, supra note 53, at 301–02. 
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goods and services receives incentives from many directions: intel-
lectual property rights, public investment in research, the profit 
motive in an capitalist economy, and competition from competitors 
for those profits are just a few examples.160 Few intellectuals would 
go so far as to say that any of the above incentives alone is adequate 
to sustain innovation, and one focus is to find a mix of incentives to 
innovate.161 Demonstrating a justification for denial that is not like-
ly to support innovation will best frame an essential facilities doc-
trine claim. 
In the context of broadband networks, ISPs have been consid-
ered competitors of a cable-affiliated ISP where the network for 
transmission—cable transmission particularly—was controlled by 
a monopolist.162 In the context of “music download platforms,” 
Apple’s use of Digital Rights Management (DRM) software to re-
strict downloaded music to Apple products was held not to be anti-
competitively wielding market power.163 Instead, between the ex-
clusivity granted to copyrighted materials and the work-around of 
burning music to a CD before reloading it into a different music 
platform that was available to consumers, the DRM was found not 
to be a facility essential for the development of platforms.164 
Many information-based economies, such as the “burgeoning 
worlds of social and mobile computing” require a great deal of in-
frastructure to reach scale, and may also require the proprietary 
information that comes from “a base of users that ‘train’” a sys-
tem.165 Also to be considered is whether the denial of the use of the 
                                                                                                                            
160 See generally BHASKAR SASTRY, MARKET STRUCTURE AND INCENTIVES FOR 
INNOVATION (June 2005), available at http://www.intertic.org/Policy%20Papers/Sastry
.pdf. 
161 See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 255, at 1533 (“What we have long known in intellectual 
property, that innovation and creativity require a mix of property and robust, substantial 
commons, is true more generally for complex modern economies.”) (arguing that another 
factor that can increase innovation is recognition of certain assets as commons that should 
be accessible to all). 
162 See Cooper, supra note 20, at 1023–24 (discussing AT&T v. City of Portland, No. 
CV99-65-PA (D. Or. June 7, 1999). 
163 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 188, at 1154 n.121. 
164 See id. 
165 See Pasquale, supra note 366 (discussing how it would take “Goliaths like Facebook 
and Apple” to displace Google from these markets, a result that would not assuage the 
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facility is able to be justified in some manner, be it through the 
standard of a legitimate business justification,166 or a demonstrably 
pro-competitive justification. 
C. How Feasible is Requiring Access to the Facility for Competitors? 
Information is a non-exhaustible, highly shareable resource.167 
Much like the characteristics defining information economies, once 
developed, the marginal cost of sharing information is relatively 
low.168 Further, at no point can a limit be reached where no more 
individuals can use information.169 With the exception of infor-
mation carrying legally-enforceable limits on distribution, such as 
intellectual property170 or government restrictions,171 information 
bears few of the structural limitations to access that plague many 
other essential facilities or resources.172 
Even channels of distribution for information are often less ca-
pacity-restricted than traditional channels of distribution. As high-
lighted by Professor Lao, if the purported essential facility in search 
is access to information by consumers, then the channels for infor-
mation are numerous: in addition to Google, consumers have ac-
cess to Bing, Yahoo, Facebook, as well as URLs.173 Only when the 
essential facility is alleged to be a finite resource like the top search 
result, or the first page of results, do feasibility concerns arise.174 
                                                                                                                            
concerns of monopolization of pools of data presenting “brute disadvantages” to 
potential competitors). 
166 See Lao, supra note 53, at 308–13 nn.246–47 (suggesting that similarly to the dicta in 
Aspen that a legitimate business justification can support a refusal to deal, some essential 
facility caselaw suggests the same standard is applicable to denial of use of an essential 
facility). 
167 See Dombalagian, supra note 144, at 5–6. 
168 See JOSEPH KENNEDY, THE DATA-DRIVEN ECONOMY, in U.S. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE FOUNDATION, THE FUTURE OF DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION 17 (2014), 
available at http://www.uschamberfoundation.org/sites/default/files/Data%20Report%
20Final%2010.23.pdf. 
169 See Hienz, supra note 373, at 3. 
170 See Farrell, supra note 1344, at 39. 
171 See Hatch & Pippert, supra note 5 (discussing distribution limitations enforced by the 
FDA). 
172 See, e.g., Lao, supra note 53, at 302–04 (discussing the limits accompanying defining 
the first slot as an essential facility). 
173 See id. at 298–301. 
174 See id. at 302–04. 
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Paying the marginal cost of added capacity to a channel of distribu-
tion is a potential solution for circumstances involving structural 
limitations.175 
Granting access to information and channels of distribution 
does not require courts to act as a “central authority,” always set-
ting prices.176 Royalty rates can be negotiated based on the value of 
information to potential competitors.177 These rates do, however, 
have the potential to approximate monopoly prices.178 
Where capacity is not a significant limiting factor, and the mo-
nopolist’s use of the facility is not impeded by the added use of a 
competitor, access can be granted on a variety of terms.179 Access 
can be provided on a retail basis,180 on a wholesale basis,181 or on 
the basis of “interconnection,” “platform,” “bundled,” or “un-
bundled” access to the essential facility.182 Where capacity is a sig-
nificant constraint, the monopolist first has a stronger argument 
that the denial of access is justified,183 and second has greater abil-
ity to approach monopoly pricing for access, even with court su-
pervision.184 Many channels of distribution for information are un-
der regulatory burdens,185 which might require permitting ac-
cess,186 provide a pricing structure,187 or remove the necessity of 
                                                                                                                            
175 See, e.g., Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1844. 
176 See id. at 1867–69 (discussing the judiciary’s lack of skill at the task and positing 
methods of access that can mitigate the dangers). 
177 See Davis, supra note 1366, at 245–46. 
178 See id. 
179 See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1874–1907 (discussing a multitude of forms of 
access left open by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Trinko). 
180 See id. at 1878–83. 
181 See id. at 1883–87. 
182 See id. at 1888–1907. 
183 See discussion supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
184 See Davis, supra note 1366, at 245–46. 
185 See Lao, supra note 53, at 288 (discussing the multitude of regulated natural 
monopolies and public utilities that come to be defined as essential facilities). 
186 See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 
398, 408–09 (2004) (describing how the regulatory structure had in the instant case not 
required access enforceable under the antitrust laws). 
187 For example the maximum access rates set by the FCC. Understanding Your 
Telephone Bill, FCC http://www.fcc.gov/guides/understanding-your-telephone-bill (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2015). 
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antitrust analysis completely.188 In many instances, fostering com-
petition is a goal of the regulatory body. For example, the FCC has 
focused on “foster[ing] competition, in particular cost-oriented 
access to essential local network facilities, and [] promot[ing] an 
open network architecture.”189 
Some channels of information distribution may be evaluated as 
the equivalent of infrastructure, potentially to the degree of being a 
regulated utility.190 Even advocates of treating “privately-owned 
commercial infrastructure” as a commons suggest that the proper 
mechanism for doing so are the “essential facilities [doctrine] on 
the antitrust side, and natural monopoly and social policy con-
straints on the regulatory side” as opposed to direct government 
regulations.191 Included in this proposal are several reasons why 
private owners might permit access on a commons-equivalent ba-
sis, or, alternatively, justifications for requiring access, namely: 
“engaging competitors in cooperative codevelopment, engaging 
users, and maintaining flexibility in the face of uncertainty.”192 
The feasibility of requiring access in information economies is 
not a significant enough burden to pose a systematic challenge to 
the essential facilities doctrine.193 Many forms of access exist that 
can address or mitigate a multitude of concerns related to this ele-
ment of the essential facilities doctrine.194 
D. Addressing Weaknesses in the Application of the Essential Facilities 
Doctrine 
Some commentators, including Phillip Areeda, have expressed 
concern over the essential facilities doctrine requiring grants of ac-
                                                                                                                            
188 See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408–09. 
189 See Cooper, supra note 20, at 1027 n.40. 
190 See FCC Launches Broad Rulemaking to Protect and Promote the Open Internet, FCC, 
http://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-launches-broad-rulemaking-protect-and-promote-
open-internet (last visited Apr 8, 2015). 
191 See Benkler, supra note 255, at 1526–27. 
192 See id. at 1528 (“These reasons certainly do cohere with the experience of network 
and high-technology industries . . . . That is, where downstream innovation increases the 
total value of the infrastructure, commons management can encourage that downstream 
effort.”). 
193 See, e.g., Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, describing five forms of access that can be 
utilized post-Trinko. 
194 See generally id. 
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cess to utilities under the guise of a tipped-network economy when, 
in fact, the utility is replicable or other alternatives exist.195 Given 
the stringent requirements of proof for the essential facilities doc-
trine, these critiques read more as hornbooks on defending against 
a claim than arguments to eliminate the doctrine from antitrust 
law.196 
Additionally, information is often considered as an item of in-
tellectual property, and in many instances is encapsulated within 
the grant of exclusivity accompanying copyrights or patents.197 Re-
quiring access to these resources cannot disregard the attached in-
tellectual property rights, and the essential facilities doctrine is un-
likely to supersede the policy of incentivizing innovation through 
granting exclusivity. Concerns about intellectual property, and its 
interaction with antitrust law, are ongoing considerations198 outside 
the immediate scope of this piece. However, the presence of intel-
lectual property is no more a universal protection of information 
held by a firm199 than it is a presumption of market power.200 
There are also persuasive economic theories that undercut the 
utility of the essential facilities doctrine.201 Proprietary standards 
may be “a natural-monopoly bottleneck,” but if the underlying 
market is ordinarily dynamic, requiring access could forestall inno-
                                                                                                                            
195 See Dombalagian, supra note 144, at 60–61 n.245, citing Phillip Areeda, Essential 
Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990) for the 
premise that it is difficult to limit the essential facilities doctrine so as not to force a duty 
to deal on dominant networks by virtue of their status. 
196 See discussion supra Part II.C., where this information would be useful in challenging 
the essential nature of a facility. 
197 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 188, at 1154 n.121 (noting how copyright protection of 
DRM software undercut arguments that Apple was abusing its dominance in the music 
download market as there was no obligation to grant access to the DRM, and the DRM 
itself was not essential to downloading music). 
198 See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
199 See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 977, at 484–85; see also Brief for Federal Trade 
Commission as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff at 1, Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Celgene Corp., No. 2:14-CV-2094-ES-MAH (D.N.J.) (ongoing 2015), 2014 WL 2968348, 
at *1; see discussion supra Part III.B. 
200 See Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006). 
201 See, e.g., Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1836–37 (discussing the One Monopoly 
Rent theory). 
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vation that would make the proprietary standard irrelevant.202 A 
market with competition but little innovation avoids the extraction 
of monopoly rent, but may provide less welfare to consumers in the 
long-run, than a “serial monopoly” where rents are extracted, but 
innovation means larger returns in utility for consumers.203 In an 
information economy consistently described as subject to Schum-
peterian disruption and innovation, it is argued that even the (“un-
spoken”) rule of thumb that “Big is Bad” is inapt given that size is 
not strongly correlated with economic staying power, with AOL 
given as a prime example.204 However, just as the appropriate 
measure of market power in Schumpeterian markets continues to 
be disputed, the anticompetitive or procompetitive impact of many 
actions is as-yet undetermined, and should not be declared per se 
legal before experience can make an appropriate judgment.205 
Just as the high investment costs may deter any entry into a 
market by firms building their products or services from the ground 
up,206 requiring access to existing informational infrastructures can 
over-incentivize entry.207 This has the potential to reduce consum-
er welfare through wasted investment resources and the failing of 
superfluous firms.208 
                                                                                                                            
202 See Richard N. Langlois, Design, Institutions, and the Evolution of Platforms, 9 J.L. 
ECON & POL’Y 1, 4 (2012) (discussing Joseph Schumpeter’s impact on the analysis of 
whether intervention is warranted). 
203 See id. (arguing that serial monopolies are likely, and preferable in markets bound by 
narrow technological standards, but that “[e]ven when platform standards are relatively 
wide in scope and seemingly durable . . . it may well be that competition among platforms 
remains the superior alternative, especially if one refuses to see antitrust and other forms 
of regulation as disinterested and costless”). 
204 See Lao, supra note 53, at 317–19. 
205 See, e.g., James Keyte, Reasonable as a Matter of Law: The Evolving Role of the Court in 
Rule of Reason Cases, ANTITRUST MAG. (Summer 2014) (discussing the potential for per 
se legality on vertical restraints after Leegin). 
206 See discussion supra accompanying notes 89–92, on the cost-structures in the 
marketplace that could deter entry and permit only those with current access to an 
essential resource to build out. 
207 See Spulber & Yoo, supra note 499, at 1843–45. 
208 See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Irony of Regulated Competition in Telecommunications, 4 
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 6 (2002) (“Where firms—entrants or incumbents—have 
been allowed wide latitude in constructing new networks, robust investment incentives 
have resulted and consumer gains have been realized. Where regulators have, 
alternatively, ambitiously regulated incumbents through network sharing obligations 
designed to ease entry barriers, an unsuitable level of entry has occurred that has resulted 
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Some antitrust commentators, looking at the essential facilities 
doctrine within the context of information economies, view the 
policy considerations as favoring a limited construction of the doc-
trine.209 For example, it is argued that requiring Google to provide 
“access” to the top result slot would freeze innovation in the mar-
ket for search, and prevent competition with the evolving products 
and services offered by Apple, Facebook, and Amazon.210 Howev-
er, this critique is distinguishable in that the top result slot is a non-
shareable resource and is a product of consistently changing utility 
to consumers, as indicated earlier in the same argument.211 As Pro-
fessor Lao states: “A distinction should be drawn between a simple 
preference for one’s own products and services, on the one hand, 
and unjustified affirmative conduct to block the competitive pro-
cess, on the other.”212 
An additional concern is present in the information economy: 
the “self-reinforcing ‘Matthew Effect’ . . . to those who already 
have much, more is given.”213 According to a “somewhat skepti-
cal” Professor Lao, the argument that requiring access to essential 
facilities will negatively impact the incentives to invest and inno-
vate “seem[s] overstated,” in part as “mandatory sharing may un-
leash innovation and competition from rivals in the downstream 
market.”214 
Although there are a number of criticisms of the essential facili-
ties doctrine, both by itself,215 and in the context of the information 
economy,216 none are so persuasive as to require setting aside the 
                                                                                                                            
in widespread losses across the industry without countervailing consumer benefits. By 
limiting the award of ‘options’ to access existing network infrastructure, rational 
investment calculation will return to the sector, restoring productive growth.”). 
209 See Lao, supra note 53, at 313. 
210 See id. at 314–15. 
211 See id. at 302–04, 317 (“Giving priority to a search engine’s own proprietary content 
in the presentation of search results is quite different [than Microsoft and Netscape, or 
Lorain Journal] because it does not affirmatively thwart a competitor’s efforts to 
compete.”). 
212 Id. at 316. 
213 Pasquale, supra note 366 (citing Robert Merton). 
214 See Lao, supra note 53, at 314. 
215 See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
410–11 (2004). 
216 See generally Lao, supra note 53. 
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doctrine in light of the different market structures inherent in in-
formation economies whose long-term implications are as-yet un-
known. 
E. Aligning the Purpose of the Essential Facilities Doctrine With 
Competition in the Information Economy 
The essential facilities doctrine seeks to benefit consumers by 
encouraging competition in markets that are susceptible to exten-
sion of a monopolist’s control. Information economies are particu-
larly dynamic, and information has an important role to play in sub-
sequent innovation and competition. With information economies, 
as the information involved can generate innovation and subse-
quent competition in its own right, access to that information is 
closely tied to the continued evolution of the new economy.217 
When the market in which a facility is denied is itself one dedicated 
to innovation, such as stem cell research denied access to patented 
stem cell technology, then the denial is additionally egregious.218 
Consumers are more likely to see benefits when more competi-
tors have access to the information necessary to compete in a mar-
ket, or in Schumpeterian environments for the market. Competi-
tion for potential profits is a driving premise of capitalism.219 Fos-
tering competition to create new products and services,220 to inno-
vate on the quality or cost of existing services,221 and to add more 
competitors to the fight for Schumpeterian markets222 is likely to 
                                                                                                                            
217 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 20, at 1027 n.40 (“What is threatened if open 
competition [for access to the Internet] is not maintained, is the continuing evolution of 
the Internet, the innovation in and the evolution of electronic network-based business, 
and therefore the competitive development of the network economy as a whole . . . Since 
damage to the dynamic of the Internet evolution could cause great economic harm, policy 
should start from a presumption that competition in access and throughout the Internet 
system must be maintained.”). 
218 See Davis, supra note 1366, at 222 (2005) (“[T]he essential facilities doctrine seems 
like a logical means of compelling an upstream patent holder to provide access to those 
research tools deemed ‘essential’ to competition in downstream innovation markets.”). 
219 See, e.g., Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 434 
F.3d 1081, 1099 (8th Cir. 2006) (Smith, J., concurring) (“Competition is the very 
hallmark of American free enterprise.”). 
220 See Hienz, supra note 373, at 5–6. 
221 See KENNEDY, supra note 1688, at 9. 
222 See Pasquale, supra note 366. 
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result in better outcomes for consumers.223 Although requiring ac-
cess to information developed by one firm has the potential to de-
crease the incentives of all firms to invest in information gathering 
and innovation, rigorous enforcement of the requirement that a fa-
cility be essential is an opposing consideration mitigating this con-
cern.224 
Innovation, interoperability, and competition are defining char-
acteristics of information economies both in the United States and 
large portions of the world, and the information necessary to ac-
complish these goals is an important foundational element.225 In-
formation is no less susceptible to characterization as a resource or 
facility than tangible items, and the economic and legal concepts 
underpinning the essential facilities doctrine are pertinent to en-
couraging competition and innovation.226 
CONCLUSION 
Information economies are no less susceptible to the existence 
of essential facilities or resources than other segments of the econ-
omy. Perhaps information has a greater likelihood of being essential 
to competition, given the capacity of information to be shared, the 
high fixed costs that can accompany its development, and its inte-
gral role in many lines of commerce. These possibilities are further 
bolstered by the reality that information begets innovation, which is 
a fundamental part of recent economic growth. 
Considering that information economies are yet to be under-
stood to the same degree as more traditional economies, even doc-
trines that have found limited applicability in one venue may find 
more utility in a new environment. As laid out in the discussions 
above, the elements of the essential facilities doctrine have many 
potential footholds in information economies that were more lim-
                                                                                                                            
223 See Gans, supra note 1266, at 56. 
224 See discussion supra Part III.C. 
225 See Marina Lao, Networks, Access, and ‘Essential Facilities’: From Terminal Railroad to 
Microsoft, 62 SMU L. Rev. 557, 557–58 (2009). 
226 See id. at 557–58 (“[T]he same legal and economic principles are equally applicable 
even if the ‘facility’ is information or some other intangible asset. Thus, the doctrine can 
also be effective in redressing competitive problems caused by the lack of access or 
interoperability in modern network industries.”). 
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ited before. There are policy arguments in addition to these struc-
tural elements that may provide new opportunity for the doctrine. 
The very nature of innovation and competition in information 
economies makes for a strong policy argument that favoring greater 
access to information as an essential facility has the potential to 
benefit consumers through greater competition and innovation. 
 
